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ABSTRACT
URBAN CRIME IN LATIN AMERICA
A CASE STUDY FROM MEDELLiN, COLOMBIA
by Brian Kenneth Blickenstaff
May 2010
Medellin, Colombia once among the most dangerous cities in the world has seen a
sharp decrease in homicides since 2002. This thesis explores the geography of violence
in Medellin from 2001 through 2005 with specific emphasis on two factors thought to
have contributed to the city' s drop in violence: Operacion Orion, a police and military
response to the bloodshed, and the 2003 disarmament and demobilization of the Bloque

Cacique Nutibara paramilitary organization. A series of Paired Sample T-Tests show
that Operacion Orion and the paramilitary demobilization seem to have contributed to
falling human rights abuses and homicides, respectively. Additionally, a one-way
ANOVA and cluster analysis detail the changing geography of homicide from 20032004. The results show that homicides are distributed across social strata, throughout the
city with a concentration of high homicides near the city center. The findings speak to a
growing body of literature on urban crime and related issues, including the importance of
infrastructure and social inclusion in urban life.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the geography of urban crime in the city of Medellin, Colombia
(Figure I) between 2001 and 2005. Specifically, it addresses the occurrence and changes in
the spatial distribution of homicides and human rights abuses in the city. Medellin, recently
known as the world's most dangerous city (Salazar 1990; Romero 2007), makes an excellent
prospect for a study of the urban geography of crime in Latin America. In addition to
assessing the overall changes in the geographic distribution of these two types of violence,
this thesis focuses on two specific events that occurred in Medellin during the study period(1) Operaci6n Orion, a 2002 military assault on militants inhabiting a Medellin

neighborhood known as Comuna 13, and (2) the 2004 disarmament and demobilization of
Medellin's Bloque Cacique Nutibara parami litary group-and how these events contributed
to the overall changes in the geography of violence in the city.
Medellin has a complex history and has not been immune to the political violence of
20 1h century Colombia. This study seeks to understand the patterns ofviolence between 2001
and 2005 in light of the larger historical and political events in Colombia and the Department
of Antioquia, where Medellin is located.
A review of past geographic crime studies, theories ofurban crime, and models of
urban geographic development will provide a contextual background for understanding
Medellin. Past studies of urban crime have approached the issue from many different
perspectives, including the relationship between violent crime and socioeconomic variables
and the various effects that fear of crime has on individuals and communities.
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Most previous studies of urban crime have been conducted in North American cities,
with only a few focusing on urban crime in Latin America. Much of the crime in Medellin
has been politically motivated (Melguizo and Crenshaw 2001; Rozema 2007, 2008; Ramirez
2008). How will the geography of crime in Medellin compare to that in other cities, both in
Latin America and elsewhere, and what might this reveal about the processes behind the
pattern?
The chapters that follow discuss the context for this study, the data from the study
period, the methodology ofthe analysis, and conclusions drawn from the analysis. Chapters
II through IV provide the scholarly and historical context for this study. Chapter II discusses
the geography of Latin American cites as well as prior studies ofurban violence. Chapter III
focuses on the history of the city of Medellin and details the specific study area used for this
research. Chapter IV shows how Medellin fits in with the larger history of Colombia,
including the period of political violence in the 201h century know as La Violencia. Chapters
V and VI focus on the datasets, methodology, research results, and discussion of my findings.
Chapter VII contains the conclusions to be drawn from analysis and how this study
contributes to our knowledge of the spatial dimensions of urban crime and violence in Latin
America.
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CHAPTER II
URBAN GEOGRAPHY IN LATIN AMERICA
The Latin American City
Latin American cities have emerged from a different cultural and colonial mold than
cities in other regions around the world. Several studies have explicitly examined the general
structure of the Latin American city. An early example is Stanislawski (1946; 1947), who
traced the development of the "grid-pattern town" and its incorporation into Spanish city
planning and colonization in Latin America. This chapter provides an overview of the
general structure of Latin American cities and explains how an understanding of this social
and physical geography can produce a more accurate picture of urban crime in Latin
America.
The grid-town pattern has been particularly important in the emergence of urban areas
across Latin America. Although not universally used at the beginning of Spanish
colonization, the Spanish crown soon mandated the plan's adoption across the region
(Stanislawski 1947). Furthermore, the grid-town pattern, with central plaza, cathedral, and
municipal offices, is a symbol of power and order. When central power-structures break
down often the grid-town pattern does as well (Stanislawski 1946). The plaza is the seat of
regional power- political and religious- and represents an important cultural space. " It is
seen as a testimony to human rationality, a defense against unbridled nature, and an example
of enlightened urban design. The plaza also provides a physical, social , and metaphorical
space for public debate about governance, cultural identity, and citizenship" (Low 2000, 32).
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Ernest Griffin and Larry Ford (1980) developed a model ofLatin American urban
structure that has been widely used.

After considering the social geography of Bogota,

Colombia, and Tijuana, Mexico, Griffin and Ford created a generalized model of the Latin
American city. The model itself represents a series of concentric circles, the innermost
(which is actually a square) representing the Central Business District (CBD). The next
circle represents the "zone of maturity . .. an area of ' better residences' in the city" (Griffin
and Ford 1980). This zone is surrounded by an area known as the "zone of in situ accretion;"
it is a dynamic zone with varied housing types and stages of development or decay (ibid).
The outer circle represents peripheral, squatter settlements (ibid). Extending outward from
the city center is a fourth, wedge shaped section that represents the zone of the most affluent
residents of the city, surrounded by a zone of commerce (see Griffin and Ford 1980). In the
1990s, Ford updated the model as the urban situation evolved (Ford 1996).
Given that Griffin and Ford' s model was based heavily on Bogota, Medellin fits it
well.
Figure 2 depicts socioeconomic stratification, as reported by the Colombian
authorities, represented at the barrio level in Medellin, strata one being the lowest and strata
six being the highest.
Figure 3 shows the principles of the Griffin-Ford Model superimposed on the map of
barrio-level socioeconomic stratification. We see that peripheral areas are composed oflow-

strata barrios with the high strata barrios contained primarily in Comuna 14.
The emergence of these peripheral squatter zones owes a great deal to the large-scale
rural-urban mi gration that began to occur across much of Latin America in the
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second half of the twentieth century as the regional economies became more industrialized.
The private sector largely failed to meet the demands for cheap urban housing, resulting in
the creation of peripheral squatter settlements (Kent 2006, 252). In Medellin in the 1960s
and 1970s, some "600,000 inhabitants arrived in the illegal barrios, almost 50% of the
population, and registered pirates and invasions in all parts, with the exception of El
Poblado" (Echeverri 2003, 331) . 1 While many national governments, including Colombia,
constructed public housing, they too failed to meet demand (Mohan 1994; Kent 2006). As a
result, it was up to the homeless to address their own housing needs and they resorted to
expansion into farmland and other open spaces on the periphery of the cities. Methods of
expansion included " . .. squatting, planned land invasions, and land subdivision" (Kent 2006,
253). Due to the contentious nature of many of these settlements, they were and are often
located on marginal land-as was the case in many of the peripheral Medellin settlements
that are located on the steep terrain that surrounds the urban core-and are at times short on
services like water and power (ibid). For example, a certain amount of unrest in Comuna 13
of Medellin, a community built largely on such steep terrain, is attributed to inadequate waste
disposal and the sanitation problems this caused for community members located down slope
(Aricapa 2007).
While ori ginally illegal, many of these squatter settlements have been recognized and
annexed into Lati n American cities, including Medellin, and services have gradually became
available to residents (Kent 2006; Aricapa 2007). These neighborhoods often evolve over
several years, from collections of improvised structures into middle-class neighborhoods
with multi-story buildings as residents became more established in the urban economy (Kent
2006).
1

El Poblado, a lso known as Com una 14, is the e li te sector of Medellin (see Figure I).
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Understanding the geographical patterns of social groups can facilitate a better
understanding of some social processes and problems such as the occurrence and geographic
distribution of crime. One of the themes of urban crime study in the last 20 years has to do
with understanding the relationship between various measurements of poverty and crime.
The theory being tested "argues that extremely high levels of community poverty and
disadvantage are what produce high levels of crime and other social problems ..." (Krivo and
Peterson 1996, 620). In general, these studies have found that high levels of violent crimehomicide in particular- are positively correlated with areas of extreme poverty. For
example, Krivo and Peterson (1996), looking at crime by census tract in Columbus, Ohio,
found that in census tracts displaying "high" and "extreme" poverty (defined as more than
40% of a given census tract living below the poverty line), poverty and "disadvantage" were
positively and significantly correlated with violent crime (ibid). 2 In this case, the more
extreme the poverty in a census tract, the stronger the positive correlation with violent crime
(ibid).
Another study has considered the effect that clustering of high-poverty census tracts
has on violent crime (Stretesky, Schuck, and Hogan 2004). This analysis of 236 cities in the
United States showed that poverty clustering was not a good predictor of high violent crime
in any one city (ibid). On the other hand, in poor neighborhoods ofNew York City,
variations in levels of disadvantage- a function of the poverty rate, median household
income, households receiving public assistance, and households headed by a single womanwere strongly correlated with homicide (Hannon 2005). Moreover, this correlation was
stronger in extreme poverty census tracts than in lower poverty census tracts, suggesting an
accelerating relationship (ibid).
2

Disadvantage was defined here as a function of poverty, household composition, and empl oymen t.
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Various studies in Brazil have shown a positive statistical relationship between
property-crime victimization and wealth (Dowsey 1986; Gaviria and Pages 2002). This
relationship has been observed with violent crime as well, which occurred primarily in the
CBD of Sao Paulo, Brazil, as well as in the city's peripheral communities (Ceccato, Haining,
and Kahn 2007).
Other Latin American studies have explored fear of crime and temporal variation in
cnme. These show that fear of gang violence can shrink personal geographies and weaken
economic opportunity and social networks (Winton 2005; Moser and Mcllwaine 2005,
2006). Investigations into temporal homicide trends have shown clusters contract and
expand at different times of the year, although rates tend to be more stable in poorer
neighborhoods (Ceccato 2005).
What the above studies repeatedly show is that violent crime, particularly homicide,
has a statistical relationship with poverty and other measurements of socioeconomic
disadvantage in urban areas. Therefore, in the context of this study, it is important to have an
understanding ofthe social geography of the 16 comunas that make up Medellin3 .
Figure 2 shows the barrios of Medellin broken into six social stratifications- a widely used
indicator of socioeconomic class in Colombia, one being the lowest and six being the highest
(El Congreso de Colombia 1994)- and as reported by the city of Medellin in 2004 (Alcalde
de Medellin 2004).4 The only comuna containing strata-six barrios is Comuna 14, or El

Poblado. El Poblado is the site of the 161 6 settlement in the Valley of Medellin, although

3

Medellin is ad ministratively divided into comunas (groups of ne ighborhoods) and barrios (neighborhoods).
The socioeconomic stratification of urban people in Colombia is undertaken by the National Department of
Planning and is based on num erous factors including income, access to household services, and housing type
and upkeep.
4

II
the actual city of Medellin was founded near Barrio La Candelaria in I675 (Alcalde de
Medellin).
The com una with the highest proportion of strata-five (or upper-middle class)
barrios is Comuna 11, which is made up of only strata-four and strata-five barrios and is
to the immediate west of Comuna 10, which contains the CBD. Comuna 12 is the next·
highest strata comuna, although it does contain two barrios of level-three strata and I of
level-two strata. Beyond the above three comunas, barrios of strata-four and higher are
rare, with low-strata barrios on all parts of the city's periphery, with the exception ofEl
Poblado. In this regard Figure 3 resembles Griffin and Ford's Model of Latin American
City Structure.
The majority of the low-strata population of Medellin lives in the city' s periphery,
an area that prior research on violent crime suggests is also likely high in crime.
Conversely, these same studies indicate it is unlikely that either Com una 11 or 14 contain
high numbers of homicides. Lastly, given the observations concerning poverty and crime
in Latin American city centers (Bromley and Jones I996), Medellin's city center also
represents a likely location of high-crime.

12

Figure 4. Comuna 14: El Poblado
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CHAPTER III
STUDY AREA
The City ofMedellin, Colombia
Colombia is a country dominated by Andean mountain ranges. Colombia's three
biggest cities are located in the Andes along with the majority of the country 's population
(Kent 2006, 132). Because altitude is such a factor in the climates of tropical mountain
regions, geographers have developed the model of altitudinal zonation used to describe the
differing climactic zones based on altitude. Medellin, at about 1,500 meters, falls into a zone
known as the Tierra Temp/ada, an area characterized by mild temperatures-around 70° (F)
in Medellin- with limited temperature fluctuation (Parsons 1968; Kent 2006).
Running north, out of Ecuador, the Andean mountain range divides from a singular
mountainous feature, the Pasto Knott, into three individual mountain ranges, themselves
divided by the country's two largest rivers-the Rio Cauca and the Rio Magdalena.
Medell in and the Antioquian Plateau are located in the central range, known as the Cordillera
Central (Parsons 1968; Kent 2006).
The specific study area used in this analysis corresponds closely with the political
boundaries of the Zona Urbana de Medellin, an area made up of 16 comunas and two
adjacent urban townships known as corregimientos. The area is located in the Valle de

Aburra and is bi sected, by the Rio Medellin, which runs north, eventually draining into the
Rio Magdalena and the Caribbean Sea. The municipality of Medellin is quite large, with
several smaller urban areas, many of which are cut off from the main urban zone by steep
mountains. The total area of the study zone is 111.38 km 2 • The highest point inside the

14
study zone is at 2260m, the lowest 1440m. While the valley floor is quite flat, the peripheral
areas are extremely steep (Figure 5).
The History of Medellin
The first Europeans to enter the Valle de Medellin were led by an Andalucian
nobleman named Jorge Robledo (Parsons 1968). Robledo' s expedition reached the Valley of
Abumi in August of 1541 and originally named it the Valle de San Bartolome (ibid, 37). The
party was searching for gold and other mineral wealth, which existed in quantity in
Antioquia, and noted the existence of an abandoned Indian settlement in the valley, complete
with highways and aqueducts (ibid).
Medell in was founded in 1675 (ibid). Throughout the Andes, and in much of the rest
of Spanish Latin America, many colonial cities fit a profile: close to native population and to
abundant quantities of precious metals (Kent 2006: 137). Mining was an important factor in
the early economy of Medellin along with cattle ranching (Parsons 1968: 60).
Agriculture and the cattle industries helped both Medellin and Antioquia rise to
regional prominence even before the introduction of coffee in the 1800s. The Antioquian
people embraced coffee cultivation and small scale agriculture, a move that shifted the
economy of the region away from dependence on mining (ibid). Governmental incentives,
an entrepreneurial spirit, and coffee set the groundwork for the opening up and settlement of
much of the Antioquian countryside in the 1800s and the early 1900s (Parsons 1968; Kent
2006). 5

5

This rural expansion was the subject for James Parson's early research.
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The labor-intensive nature of the Antioquian coffee boom, and the demand it created
for agricultural products and secondary industry contributed to the rise of Medellin as a
manufacturing hub (Parsons 1968; Kent 2006). As this industrial growth continued into the
1920s, the Medellin economy diversified into textiles as well. Industrialization happened in
the department of Antioquia before much of Colombia and greater Latin America (Parsons
1968, 175). The value of the textile output in Antioquia was twice that of exported coffee in
1945, not an unimpressive feat, as Antioquia also led the nation in coffee production through
at least the1960s (ibid). In the 1960s, Coltejer, the largest textile firm in Colombia and one
of two headquartered in the city, had enough stockholders to make it a leading Latin
American company in terms of total shareholders (ibid, 181 ). In the 1960s Medellin was a
leading economic center producing coffee and textiles and containing one of Latin America' s
largest livestock trade-yards (Parsons 1968, 132), an organization that matched Coltejer in
sales in 1966 (ibid).
Colombia entered a difficult economic period in the mid-1960s due to complex
problems related to the country's competitive advantage with regard to cheap labor and
transportation infrastructure (Palacios 2006). The economic picture worsened through the
1970s with high unemployment and high inflation, which reached 33% in 1977 (Palacios
2006). By the mid-1980s, the country 's economy was in full-blown crisis (ibid). While
aspects of the economy had diversified in Medellin, in Colombia coffee remained king
through the 1980s until the 1989 breakdown of the global coffee agreement (Palacios 2006).
What this economic slump meant for Medellin and Colombia's other urban centers,
all of which had been receiving large numbers of rural-urban migrants for the previous 70
years, was unemployment and the growth of the economy's "informal sector," in which

17

about 50% of the population took part as of 1985 (Palacios 2006). Around the same time,
some Colombians began to trade in another cash crop, coca, and particularly its processed
form: cocaine. Among Colombia's more populous cities, Medellin has been commonly
associated with the drug trade, and the criminal activities associated with it. The drug trade
partly helped usher in a period of extreme violence that took place in Medellin in the 1980s
and 1990s.

18
CHAPTER IV
VIOLENCE IN MEDELLIN: FROM NATIONAL TO LOCAL, PAST TO PRESENT
Medellin has experienced extreme violence (Melguizo and Cronshaw 2001; Echeverri
2003; Riafio-Alcahi 2006; Aricapa 2007; Ramirez 2007; Rendon 2007; Rozema 2007;
Salazar 2007). This violence is an extension of problems that exist on a national level, the
roots of which are complex. The historical and political legacy of a period during the 201h
century known as La Violencia in Colombia influenced the contemporary reality of Medellin.

La Violencia gave rise to left-wing and right-wing militant groups and contributed to largescale urban migration. All of these forces contributed to conditions that would cause
Medellin to be described as the most dangerous city in the world.

La Violencia, the Roots of Contemporary Conflict
La Violencia is best described as a low-grade civil war set off by multiple social and
political tensions. In the Department of Antioquia, in the early parts of the 1900s, a social
and political change was in the works. From 1912 to 1951 Medellin's population grew fivefold (Roldan 2002). Meanwhile, in rural Antioquia, a process of rural colonization was
taking place in areas that later become important coffee sectors (Parsons 1968) where
Antioquian culture came into contact with colonists from other areas, and ultimately, become
locations of violence (Roldan 2002).
For much of its history two main political parties, Liberals and Conservatives, have
dominated Colombian politics. In the 1940s, these two political parti es were strongly
divided and political participation was low. In this atmosphere, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, former
Mayor of Bogota and Minister ofEducation and presidential candidate, became the
undisputed leader of the Liberal party (Palacios 2006). A populist, Gaitan expressed concern
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for the poor and was critical of the Colombia oligarchy (ibid). Before his death, he was the
most influential politician of his time and under his leadership political participation was
very high: 56% in 1947 (immediately after his death it rose to an even higher 63 percent)
(ibid).
The conservatives won the Colombian presidency in 1946, after 16 years of liberal
rule. The impacts of demographic changes worried the conservative elite in Antioquia.
Their fears of a Liberal uprising combined with Gaitan's popularity in the mid-1940s led to a
series of politically motivated mayoral appointments6 and political harassment throughout
Antioquia that was aimed at converting Liberal towns into areas of Conservative support in
the run-up to the regional and local elections of 1947 (ibid). These actions created economic
problems for regional elites and businessmen- like hacienda owne'rs-and led to a rise in
labor strikes amongst fears of Conservative persecution 7. Police had been used by the
government (by both parties) as strike-breakers for years and when "animosity between
workers and police took on partisan overtones, the tension between these two groups rose to
new heights" of tension that only increased after the April 91h 1948 assassination of Gaitan
(ibid, 68).
Gaitan 's assassination was a major event in Colombian history, seen by many as the
final catalyst to La Violencia, (Bushnell 1993 ; Roldan 2002). His assassination in Bogota set
off immediate scenes ofviolence in major cities around the country. Even though the
outbreak of violence was not limited to Bogota, the event became known as the bogotazo 8,

6

Mayors were appointed rather than elected and the officers often had little connection to their constituencies.
There had been Liberal-perpetrated violence and persecution after the Liberal victory of 1930 and as Bailey
( 1967) put it " ... the triumphant Conservati ves in many parts of Colombia paid back their Li beral neighbors with
accrued interest.. ." a fter the election (p. 565).
8
Palacios (2006) notes that Gaitan had "[o]n many occasions ... told his fo llowers, ' If they kill me, avenge me! "'
(p, 14 1)
7
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and was essentially a massive riot that left thousands dead and was denounced by then
Colombian President Ospina as a Communist plot (ibid). However, today it is accepted that
Gaitan's assassin acted alone and that the bogotazo was a spontaneous reaction to Gaitan's
death (Bushnell 1993, 204).
While there was state sanctioned violence in Antioquia prior to Gaitan's
assassination, his death amplified the violence. And while the violence that followed was
severe, it continued to be cyclical and varied (Roldan 2002, 69). As liberal gaitanistas rose
up in various Liberal dominated sectors of Antioquia, the Governor created and armed a
"civilian police corps" (ibid, 71). In Medellin, Gaitan's death and the Liberal reaction served
as an excuse to jail Gaitan's supporters and "to justify the general harassment and dismissal
of state employees and workers everywhere" (Roldan 2002, 71 ). In April 1948, a new
governor, Arango Ferrer, was appointed. Though only in office for a little under seven
months, Ferrer was very influential in the creation of state-funded civilian police corps that
later became known as paramilitaries. The paramilitaries were paid by customs officials (a
group that became feared) and operated outside the jurisdiction of municipal councils.
The emergence of the contrachusma9 and other paramilitaries was a turning point in
the politics of violence in Antioquia (Roldan 2002; Palacios 2006). Nationally, paramilitary
groups ranged in size but were usually made up of less than 50 armed-men, although some
groups were much larger. In the 1950s there were several hundred such groups in the
country (Palacios 2006, 160).
The key characteristics of the Violencia [sic], and the key
obstacle to its study, is that relatively few deaths were the
result of armed contacts between guerrillas or other unofficial
forces on one side and military, police, or other state forces on
the other. One or another armed group, legal or illegal, would
9

Literally "anti-vermin"
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take over a territory and impose its control on the population.
Deaths were caused less by acts of war, however
unconventional, than by atrocities and vengeances (Palacios
2006, 137).
Violence ebbed and flowed in this period, as Conservatives attempted
"conservatization" of certain areas (ibid). After the June 1949 elections the escalation of
violence continued and conservative politicians took an even more "hard-line" approach to
gaining political power. This represents the first period of widespread violence in Antioquia.
Mayoral offices were then being used as seats of unabashed oppression. Mayors with
criminal records, including homicide and assault charges, were appointed around the
department, often in collusion with the contrachusmas. In October of the same year, the
Antioquian governor's office began to receive the first reports of Liberal-perpetrated
violence in the department (ibid).
After Laureano Gomez's 1950 election as President of Colombia, an election in
which the Liberals did not field a candidate, electoral violence gave way to rebellion as
liberal guerrillas began to respond to escalated official violence (Roldan 2002). La Violencia
had entered its second phase: public workers began to resist violent influence and guerrillas
began using force (Roldan 2002; Palacios 2006).
While partisan violence was clearly a factor during the beginning of La Violencia,
some patterns of violence were not motivated by politics. Antioquian violence often took
place in areas of social or cultural difference, places where Antioqueno values were seen
nonexistent or under threat, often areas recently colonized and/or largely outside of regional
control (Roldan 2002, 286). "Peripheral" municipalities, those seen as culturally different
and often inferior to Antioquian culture, were disproportionately the locations of severe
violence (Roldan 2002; Riai'io-Alcala 2006). This " ... coincidence of ethnicity and culture,

22
geography, and class has persisted beyond the period of la Violencia to define the parameters
of contemporary violence and its primary victims" (Roldan 2002, 298).
La Violencia was also a strong catalyst for rural-urban migration. The migrants, who
moved in droves to urban areas, were often the very peripherallnon-Antioquian people who
so threatened the cultural identity of Antioquefiidad or "Ia raza Antioquefia" (Parsons 1968,
3). As they migrated to cities like Medellin, they brought with them the cultural behaviors
and values associated with their native cities and towns. In the 1960s and 1970s, 50 percent
of Medellin's new arrivals lived in dangerously steep, peripheral, clandestine neighborhoods
or settlements that would later become stigmatized as violent (Riaiio-Alcala 2006).
In addition to large-scale urban migration, partisan violence, banditry, and agrarian
conflict, the appeal of Marxist ideology grew, coinciding with the creation of national-scale
left-wing militant groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and
the Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional (ELN), and important religious and social changes, such
as liberation theology (Bushnell 1993; Palacios and Safford 2002; Palacios 2006; RiaiioAlcala 2006).

Contemporary Violence
The FARC is the largest and most famous left-wing guerrilla organization in
Colombia, and until the fall of the Berlin Wall, held close ideological similarities with the
Soviet Union (Gutierrez Sanin 2004). The FARC grew out of left-wing insurgencies that
were active during the early years of La Violencia and later progressed into organized,
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peasant self-defense forces (Gutierrez Sanin 2004; Palacios 2006). Eventually, it developed
the military capacity to contest urban zones in cities like Medellin.
In the 1920s and 1930s a Communist movement rose in the Magdalena Valley in
response to agrarian conflicts (Bushnell 1993, 173). The Communists developed a political
front active in Colombia fro 1900sm the 1930s (ibid), with aspirations of legitimate political
power that it only began to achieve through the CSTC (Conferderaci6n Sindical de

Trabajadores de Colombia), a workers' union created in the 1960s (ibid, 243). While the
FARC was not the militant wing of the Communist party, the two groups learned to
cooperate on occasion (ibid), though the FARC ended its "ties" with the Communist party in
the 1980s (Palacios 2006).
In the early years of the FARC, it had little success either in combat or in recruiting
(Gutierrez Sanfn 2004). The FARC's main activity through the mid-1970s had to do more
with protecting rural peasants and "frontier colonists," than waging war against the
government (Bushnell 1993, 244). Starting in the late 1970s, the FARC began to change in
size and capabilities, growing from a force estimated at around 500 members in 1978 to one
that in 2004 contained up to 20,000 members, of whom an estimated 30 percent were women
(Gutierrez Sanfn 2004, 264-265).
Gutierrez Sanin (2004) offers four explanations for the growth in size and capabi lity
of the guerri llas: (1) an increase in illicit activities- drugs, kidnapping and robberies- ; (2) a
fundamental economic shift from coffee to one based predominantly on illicit crops; (3) a
"heating" of the political atmosphere: a general disenchantment with contemporary politics
(i.e. the National Front and corruption); and (4) advancement in guerrilla tactics (ibid, 263264).
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Gutierrez Sanin's reference to advanced guerrilla tactics refers primarily to the
success of a third guerrilla group that operated during the 1970s known as M-19. While the
FARC and ELN were primarily rural fighting forces prior to the 1970s, the M-19 operated in
urban zones and focused more on bold assaults than on rural low-grade warfare (Gutierrez
Sanin 2004; Palacios 2006). While M-19 were, militarily speaking, less successful than the
FARC, they did seem to have considerable popular, middle-class support and Gutierrez Sanin
claims that the F ARC and ELN have gone on to use "many of the political motives and
techniques that M-19 had discovered" (Gutierrez Sanin 2004, 264).
The ELN is the second largest left-wing guerrilla group in Colombia. Like the
FARC, the ELN emerged in the 1960s and was originally unsuccessful with numbers of a
little more than 100 in the 1970s. Beginning in the late 1970s, the·ELN went through a boom
period with around 6000 members by 2004 (ibid) 10 . Geographically speaking, again like the
FARC, the ELN has its roots in areas of previous leftist militant activity (Palacios 2006).
The fundamental difference between the two groups has to do with their origins: while the
FARC were home grown, the ELN were inspired and trained by Cuban revolutionaries with
the specific goal of overthrowing the government (Gutierrez Sanin 2004; Palacios 2006).
The ELN were more of a top down revolutionary movement, incorporating more academics
(and even clergy members) than the FARC (Palacios 2006). The two groups have on
occasion co llaborated with one another, as they did in Comuna 13 of Medellin (Interview
with social worker in 2008), and in other disputed territory (Rozema 2007).
The current Colombian conflict ostensibly takes place between the leftist guerrillas,
the State, and the right-wing Colombian paramilitaries. In reality, differentiating between the

10

This number is evidently down from its peak (ibid, 265).
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numerous militant groups active in Colombia can be fairly difficult (see Sanin 2008;
Melguizo and Cra nshaw 2001 ).
In addition to expanding paramilitary and left-wing militant groups, government
military expenditure increased during the 1980s in an effort to get the drug trade under
control (Escobar 2000). Some observers believe the Colombian government's inability to
exert state control is a root cause of paramilitarization via the government legalization of
various peasant self defense groups, many of which were "rapidly assimilated into
paramilitary squads" (ibid, 113).
Political and economic events, too, contributed to instability in the early 1980s.
Coffee prices, which had been high throughout the 1970s, collapsed and national
unemployment increased (Mohan 1994; Escobar 2000; Palacios 2006). The city of Medellin
acutely suffered from the affects of increasing economic uncertainty, drug-fueled corruption,
and violence (Riafio-Alcal<i 2006). In 1990, Medellin was paradoxically the richest city in
the country yet had the highest rate of unemployment and crime (ibid). Meanwhile, the
nation-wide homicide rate grew to more than 80 per 100,000 people, far higher than at the
height of La Violencia (Brauer, G6mez-Sorzano, and Sethuraman 2004).
One of the factors that made the situation in Medellin unique was the consolidation of
drug trafficking that gave rise to the Medellin Cartel (Melguizo and Cranshaw 200 1). The
fact that Medellin was essentially controlled by a drug cartel is not in-and-of-itself unique;
rather, what is unique is the power that the cartel grew to wield. Not only did the money
associated with the cartels (and not just the Medell in Cartel) affect local, regional, and
national politics, but the cartels, and especially the Medellin Cartel, used violence to affect
change as well (Bagley 1988; Salazar 1990; Melguizo and Cranshaw 200 1; Rozema 2008).
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Outside of terrorism, the cartels were involved in Colombian violence in different
ways: by employing large numbers of youth assassins in cities like Medellin, and helping to
create paramilitary groups (Rozema 2008). While backing rural paramilitaries served to
further intensify long-standing agrarian conflicts, the Cartel's army of assassins had a more
immediate effect on the city itself.
Pablo Escobar, the leader of the Medellin Cartel, was gunned down in a Medellin
neighborhood in 1993. It was hoped that with Escobar's death, his cartel would break up and
the police would be better able to control organized crime in both Medellin and Colombia
(Melguizo and Crenshaw 2001 ). While the cartel did break up, authorities saw an immediate
increase in violence rather than a sudden drop, as youth gangs vied for power in the sudden
power vacuum (Melguizo and Crenshaw 2001; Rozema 2008)
Around the same time, several different types of armed groups emerged in Medellin.
These local groups ultimately included national-level actors like the F ARC and the ELN as
well as various paramilitary "Bloques" (Melguizo and Crenshaw 2001 ; Echeverri 2003;
Aricapa 2007; Rendon 2007; Rozema 2007, 2008). These different groups governed
different parts of the city to the point that the local government even entered into
nonaggression pacts with the various militant groups (Ramirez 2007). The armed groups'
actions varied from self-defense, to neighborhood "policing," to hired assassins, petty gangs,
and to the drug trade, creating a wide range of motivations for armed actors and paving the
way for frequent confrontation.
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Toward the end of the 1990s, elements of the F ARC and ELN began to appear in the
city (Noche y Niebla 2007; Rozema 2008).

11

At the same time loose criminal networks and

gangs began to consolidate and paramilitaries began to assume power, having entered the city
from rural areas (Gutierrez Sanin and Jaramillo 2004; Rozema 2008). As one might expect,
Medellin was faced with a period of urban warfare which ultimately led to paramilitaries and
left-wing militants consolidating power over different areas of the city, with the left-wing
militants primarily on the periphery (Riafio-Alcala 2006; Rozema 2007, 2008). One of these
areas of left-wing consolidation occurred in the central-eastern zone of the city known as

Comuna 13 (Aricapa 2007; Rozema 2008).
Comuna 13 became quite high profile as, in 2002, elements ofthe Colombian
military, National Police, and additional government forces launched Operaci6n Orion, in an
effort to retake the community andre-exert state control over the city (Noche y Niebla 2003 ;
Riafio-Alcal<i 2006; Aricapa 2007; Ramirez 2007; Rendon 2007; Rozema 2007, 2008).
While the event was deemed successful, corresponding with increased state control and a
drop in crime (Ramirez 2008) it was also controversial, with allegations of collusion between
the military and paramilitaries.
In late 2003 another important event occurred in Medellin: a paramilitary
disarmament (Presidencia de la Republica Oficina Alto Comisionado para laPaz 2006;
Rozema 2007, 2008). The disarmament in Medellin was the first of many that have now
taken place around Colombia (Presidencia de la Republica Oficina Alto Comisionado para la
Paz 2006). It was a well-publicized event with some 800 paramilitaries taking part. Yet
some skepticism remains regarding the effectiveness of the event due to the relatively small
11

These groups had been active in the city during failed peace talks in the early 1980s. While they left after
these talks fell through, the mi litary training they gave to some people during this period influenced later violent
confrontations.
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number of weapons that were turned in during the demobilization and disarmament process
and the persistent links between the paramilitary members and "normal" organized crime
networks still at work in the city (Rozema 2007, 2008).
This study was designed to better understand the declining violence in Medellin
during the first five years of this century. The fo llowing sections detail shifts in the
geography of homicide and human rights violations and the impact that both Op eraci6n
Orion and the paramilitary demobilization may have had on the relative peace in the city.
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CHAPTER V
METHODOLOGY
As a way to examine the geography of violence in Medellin, I will analyze two
separate datasets using a variety of statistical techniques. I will address a series of questions,
specific to each dataset, in the hope of gaining a better understanding of how the location of
different forms of violence has changed overtime and in relation to both Operaci6n Orion
and the paramilitary demobilization.
The two datasets are different from one another in both size and content. The first
contains homicide data compiled from police reports from 2003 and 2004 in Medellin. The
second dataset contains cases of deadly human rights violations that occurred in the city from
2001 through 2005. They are compiled from the Noche y Niebla Banco de Datos de
Derechos Humanos y Violencia Politica: a database of human rights abuses put together by

the Centro de Jnvestigaci6n y Educaci6n Popular (CINEP), a Colombian human rights
group. Lastly, I will include neighborhood level socioeconomic data published by the city of
Medellin as a means to consider the interaction between violence and socioeconomic class in
the city.
Homicide Data Set
Data Preparation

The homicide dataset consists of compi led police reports, specifically incidences of
common homicide, which occurred in the city of Medellin during 2003 to 2004. Because the
dataset is based on information not specifically designed for this project, the data required
some processing prior to analysis. For example, some incidents in thi s dataset refer to areas
inside the municipality of Medellin but outside the designated study area; others refer to large
colloquially named neighborhoods within the city without formal boundaries; incidents of
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homicide that occurred in these neighborhoods were therefore unusable. The barrios of
Medellin make up the primary geographic unit used in this analysis. In total, 208 cases of
homicide were excluded from the analysis based on the situations described above.
Occasionally, two barrios with the same name appear in the dataset without
differentiation. For example, a homicide may have been recorded in the barrio Doce de
Octobre, a name that refers to two separate barrios: Doce de Octubre #I and Doce de
Octubre #2. This issue was encountered in six separate pairs of barrios around the city; 12
barrios were therefore merged and the outcomes- six barrios- were used in their place.
Question Preparation
Question one. Was homicide clustered in Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
This question was addressed through the use of a study area-wide Moran's I test for
autocorrelation, a statistic that, in this case, compares neighborhood-level differences in
homicides to citywide averages to determine the level of citywide clustering. The Moran's I
was calculated with weights based on intra-barrio spatial contiguity. Because the barrios that
share a border with one another were given a weight, and more distant barrios and corner
connections were excluded, the analysis is local to the extreme. I chose this type of spatial
weighting because much of the violence in Medellin in recent decades has been dominated
by micro-territorial gang warfare (Melguizo and Cronshaw 200 1; Rozema 2008). The
analysis is designed to reflect these local territorial struggles.
In addition to contiguity weighting, the data was row-standardized to account for
peripheral barrios that have fewer average neighbors. This function weights the barrios in
the target barrio's neighborhood based on its total number of neighboring features (Mitchell
2005).
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Question two. How did bi-monthly neighborhood-level homicide clustering change

over time in Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
Question two was addressed through the use of a clustering statistic known as the
Getis Ord Gi* , also known as a hot spot analysis. This statistical analysis was completed
twelve different times, each time representing a two-month period from January 2003
through December 2004. The Getis Ord Gi * produces a Z-score that represents the Getis Ord
Gi* statistic: an indicator of where there are local clusters ofhigh and low homicide barrios.
The version used in this analysis- the Getis Ord Gi*- reports the Z-score as the Gi* statistic
(ibid, 179). While the Getis Ord Gi* concerns itself with the location oflocalized clusters
around the city- as opposed to the Moran I statistic which looks at clustering in the city as a
whole- the calculation of the Gi* statistic in this analysis uses the same parameters as that of
the Moran I in question one: weights based on spatial contiguity and row standardization.
The values derived from the statistical analysis were used in two ways. To begin
with, the stati stics were rendered visually in a series of twelve maps, each representing the
distribution of barrio-level clustered homicides during one of the twelve two-month time
periods.
In addition to the maps, the Gi * statistic was correlated with an indicator of time,
numerically represented by time period ( 1-12) in order to address increases or decreases of
homicide clusters over time. Prior to running this correlation I aggregated the barrio level
Gi* values to the larger comuna level. By running the correlation using comunas rather than
barrios I was able to get a sense of how large neighborhoods-groups of barrios-changed

over time as opposed to how the hundreds of barrios behaved individually. As a result the
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clustering output is more easily understood when considering how clustering changed
citywide.

Question three. How did bimonthly neighborhood-level homicide totals change over
time in Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
This question was addressed in much the same way as question two, the major
difference being the substitution of raw homicide numbers for the clustering figures used in
question two. Here, the total homicides per barrio per time period were aggregated to the
comuna level and correlated against time. The results indicate the overall rise or fall in
homicides in the various communities across Medellin during the study period.

Question four. How were the neighborhood-level homicide clusters affected by the
November 2003 disarmament and demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara
paramilitary organization?
This question addresses the impact of the paramilitary disarmament through at-test
statistic. The t-test is an ideal choice for assessing the degree of variation between two time
periods, in the case before the paramilitary disarmament and after the disarmament. Prior to
running this statistical analysis these homicide data were broken into two groups- predemobilization and post-demobilization- and normalized according to the length of the two
periods. These normalized data were then run through a cluster analysis using the Getis Ord
Gi* statistic at the barrio level.
After the Getis Ord Gi* analyses the clustering values from the two time periods were
compared using a paired t-test; the paired t-test is appropriate when comparing data taken

33
from the same population: the city of Medellin. The statistic produces results that indicate
the significance of any variation that exists between the two samples. In this case the results
will indicate the variation in cluster strength that exists between the two time periods.

Question five. How was the neighborhood-level distribution of homicide affected by
the November 2003 disarmament and demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara
paramilitary organization?
This question was addressed using the same statistical techniques as question four,
the difference being that instead of using the clustering values derived from the Geti s Ord
Gi* stati stic, total homicides per barrio per time period (before and after the paramilitary
disarmament) were used. The results of the paired t-test show the significance of barriolevel homicide variation that exists between the two time periods, an indicator of the impact
the disarmament had on crime in Medellin.

Question Six. Do the bi-monthly results from question 2 and 3 show November 2003
to be an important time-period when considering changes in raw homicide numbers and
clustering of homicide?
This question is designed to corroborate the results observed in question four and five
using the clustering results from questions two and three. If the results of question four and
five indicate the date of the paramilitary disarmament is associated with significant variation,
before and after, then a similar amount of variation should be seen when addressing variation
amongst the twelve time periods used in questions two and three. Specifically, the time
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period containing November and December of2003 should represent a split- a significant
amount of variation- between it and later time periods.
Human Rights Abuse Data Set
The Human Rights Abuse Data Set differs from the Homicide Data set in several
ways. It is not based on police information but rather on reported human rights violations
compiled by CINEP and collected in their Noche y Niebla Banco de Datos de Derechos
Humanos y Violencia Politica. Additionally, it covers a longer time span than the Homicide

Dataset (four years rather than two) but contains fewer total incidents. Although not
designed specifically for academic analysis, similar CINEP data has been used by researchers
studying violence elsewhere in Colombia (Vargas 2009). In addition to geographic
information, this Noche y Niebla database contains information on the specifics of each
reported case of human rights abuse as well as temporal information.

Data Preparation

To turn the compiled data into a workable dataset I had to (1) verify geographical
locations in order to make sure they correspond to my GIS layer containing the barrios of
Medellin and (2) group different types of abuse into relevant categories. 12
The geographic information in the Noche y Niebla databank was not uniform. Some
incidents referenced a specific street address or cross street, while some referenced a barrio
by name, and still others included both barrio name and street address. Where a barrio name

12

This G IS layer was c reated by the Geosire research group in Bogota, Colombia.
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was not included, I was able to place an event in its relevant barrio by cross-referencing the
included cross streets information with a GIS layer containing all the roads in Medellin.

13

While completing this step, I found that some events occurred on streets that were
themselves the border between two or more barrios. I wanted to avoid dividing events
amongst more than one barrio but at the same time I did not want to place any event that
occurred on a barrio boundary arbitrari ly and introduce bias into this study. In order to avoid
these two scenarios I maintained a uniform convention as I completed the process of
verifying barrio location through the use of street address: if the event took place on a
border-road it was always placed in (1) the barrio to the east and (2) the barrio to the north.
For example, if the event took place on a four-way intersection that also represented the
nexus of four barrios, the event was " placed" in the northeastern-most barrio.
Another issue encountered while preparing these data had to do with missing street
names. Some of the winding and confusing streets in the mountainous peripheral section of
the city were left blank by the analyst who created the GIS layer. Often, it was easy to figure
out where these streets would have been based on the labeled streets in the surrounding area.
If the assumed location was in the center of a barrio (far from a border), I included that

barrio as the location of an event. For example, the location of an event could have been
included in the Noche y Niebla databank as Calle 27 con Carrera 8 (2ih Street and 81h
Avenue). If, for example, I knew the location of Calle 26, as well as that of Calle 28, and
there was an unnamed street in between the two, and this unnamed street crossed Carrera 8
in the center of a barrio, I concluded that the barrio in question was the location of the event.
If unable to make an educated estimate on the location of an event- too many unnamed

13

This GIS layer was created by Geosire as we ll
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streets and cross streets-! eliminated the event from the geographical portion of this
analysis.
The various types of human rights abuses were grouped into four corresponding
categories: murder, wounding, intimidation, and property destruction. The murder category
includes all human ri ghts abuses that resulted in death of the victim: extrajudicial killings,
assassinations, and people killed in crossfire. People listed as " disappeared," los
desaparecidos, were also included in this category. The wounding category includes all

people hurt as a result of events such as an attempted assassination, a bombing, torture, or
cross fire. Intimidation refers to people who were intimidated but not physically harmed:
forced displacement, intimidation, and kidnappings (as these presumably resulted in a
release). Property destruction refers to just that: destroyed property.
Not all of the events contain only one type of abuse. For example, in one incident
several people may have been hit by crossfire, some killed and some wounded. In this case I
would list the total number of people wounded and the total killed as 2 separate incidents.
Similarly, some incidents are reported by Noche y Niebla as having occurred in more
than one barrio. In cases of thi s sort, I took the total number of victims of abuse, by
category, and divided the number by the total number of barrios included in the incident
report. I then gave each barrio an equal share of each type of abuse. The result is that each
barrio would then have, for example, 3.5 murders, each, for a particular event involving two
barrios and seven victims. The analysis reported in thi s case study refers only to the human

rights abuses included in the " murder" category.
Question Preparation
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Question One. Is there a significant negative correlation with monthly human rights
abuses and time?
The total number of victims of deadly human rights abuses reported was totaled by
month and a Spearman' s correlation was run with these monthly totals and a time indicator.
The indicator used was the number of the month in the time period, increasing from January
2001 (month one) through December 2005 (month 48). Set up in this way a negative
correlation would be indicative of a decreasing total number of deadly rights abuses over
time.

Question two. Is there a significant amount of variance· in deadly human rights
abuses before and after Operacion Orion?
To begin with, the dataset was broken into two time periods, before Operacion Orion
and after Operacion Orion. The four-day period associated with Operacion Orion was left
out of the analysis in order to avoid skewing the analysis toward Comuna 13, where all of the
deadly rights abuses reported during Operacion Orion took place. These data in these two
time periods were then normalized based on the number of days included in each period. I
then preformed a hotspot analysis using the Getis Ord Gi* statistic. This analysis was
performed using the same parameters discussed with regard to the Homicide Data Set. The
outcome showed where statisticall y significant high-homicide and low-homicide clusters
were located. After the initial cluster analysis the results were compared using a paired t-test
to assess the level of variance of total deadly human rights abuses that exist between the two
periods in question.
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Question three. Is there a significant amount of variance in the clustering of deadly
human rights abuses before and after Operacion Orion ?
This question was addressed using the very same methodology used in Question One
of thi s dataset. The only difference between the two is the variable used in the t-test for
variance. Rather than using total homicides as the variable, this question uses the cluster
value to determine the level of variance in cluster value per barrio that existed before and
after Operacion Orion.

Socioeconomic Indicators

Question One. Is the geography of homicide from 2003 -2004 positively correlated
with indicators of socioeconomic class in Medellin?
In addition to studying the geographic distribution of homicides and human rights
abuses in Medellin, I looked at the relationship between class and homicide. The
socioeconomic data used for thi s analysis are from 2005 and are available on the website of
the city of Medellin at the barrio level. These data are reportedly compiled based primarily
on housing type. Each barrio throughout the city is ranked, one through six. Level one is
considered to be socioeconomic low, predominantly made up of the poorest housing types,
while strata six indicates that the barrio is composed of residents of the highest
socioeconomic group and the most lavish housing.
The question is addressed through a Spearman's correlation using barrio level
homicide and socioeconomic data. The resu lts indicate the level of correlation between
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combined homicides from 2003 through 2004 and the published figures on socioeconomic
stratification from 2005.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Homicide Data Set
Through the statistical analysis of the Homicide Data Set I aimed to answer several
specific questions:
1. Was homicide clustered in Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
2. How did bi-monthly neighborhood-level homicide clustering change over time in
Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
3. How did bimonthly neighborhood-level homicide totals change over time in Medellin
during 2003 and 2004?
4. How were the neighborhood-level homicide clusters affected by the November 2003
disarmament and demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara paramilitary
organization?
5. How was the neighborhood-level distribution of homicide affected by the November
2003 disarmament and demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara paramilitary
organization?
6. Do the bi-monthly results from question 2 and 3 show November 2003 to be an
important time-period when considering changes in raw homicide numbers and
clustering of homicide?
Question one. Was homicide clustered in Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
The results of the global Moran's I test for autocorrelation show the degree of citywide
homicide clustering during each of the twelve two-month periods. The results were varied, at
times positive and significant-indicating strong clustering of like values-and at other times
random (Table 1). There was no negative Z-value associated with the statistic: an indicator
of overall dispersion or evenly distributed features. There were only four periods that
reflected statistically significant clustering, significant enough to rule out the possibility of
clustering being caused by random chance (22: 1.96). These two-month periods were
January to February 2003; July to August 2003; March to April,
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Table 1.

Global Moran 's I test for Autocorrelation. Dataset A
Period
January-February, 2003
March-April, 2003
May-June, 2003
July-August, 2003
September-October, 2003
November-December, 2003
January-February, 2004
March-April, 2004
May-June, 2004
July-August, 2004
September-October, 2004
November-December, 2004

Moran's I
Moran's I Index

Z Score

Outcome

0.06
0.09
0.07
0.11
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.07
0.15
0.06
0.08
0.05

1.71
2.39
1.9
2.96
0.76
1.13
1.2
1.95
4.2
1.68
2.13
1.58

Random
Clustered
Random
Clustered
Random
Random
Random
Random
Clustered
Random
Clustered
Random

2004; and September to October 2004. Homicides across the city of Medellin from 2003
through 2004 were, for the most part, not clustered.
The Moran 's I statistic shows that there is no discernible citywide trend in homicide
clustering or dispersion during the study period. Due to the stigma of high violence
associated with the various peripheral comunas in Medellin, specifically Comuna 13 and

Comuna 1, I had expected strong citywide homicide clustering. This is not the case.

Question two. How did bi-monthly neighborhood-level homicide clustering change
over time in Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
Figure 6 through Figure 17 are maps displaying bi -monthly neighborhood-level
clustering from 2003 and 2004 in Medellin. While the results from the preceding question
indicate that crime was not usually clustered in the city as a whole, these maps show
clustering results at a more localized, neighborhood level. The maps were created to show
the clustering of barrios throughout the city, and these clustering data have been aggregated
to the larger comuna level for analysis over time ; from here the clustering value of each
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comuna was correlated against the 12 time periods. The results, shown in Appendix B,
indicate the degree of net increase or decrease in strength of clustering, over time, in each

comuna from 2003 to 2004 in Medellin, Colombia. There were several comunas without any
significant positive or negative correlation with Getis-Ord Gi* : Comunas 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13,
14, 15, and 37. Here, three specific comunas stood out- Comuna 5, Comuna 10, and

Comuna 13. Comuna 13 is an interesting inclusion in this list because it has a history of
violence, while Comunas 10 and 5 are interesting because they have visible high-homicide
clusters in all of the 12 time periods. These results show that despite the cluster in Comuna

10, there was little change in strength, or relative homicides. The Comuna 5 clusters
appeared in the entire series of maps, and varied in location and number. While this comuna
visually changed, there was not an overall pattern to its rate of clustering.
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Figure 6. Period 1 Homicide Clusters in Medellin. 1:80,000 scale.
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Figure 12. Period 7 Homicide Clusters in Medell in. l :80,000 scale.
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Figure 15. Period 10 Homicide Clusters in Medellin. 1:80,000 scale.
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Figure 17. Period 12 Homicide Clusters in Medellin. 1:80,000 scale.
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Question three. How did bimonthly neighborhood-level homicide totals change over
time in Medellin during 2003 and 2004?
In general, the correlation results in Appendix A show a negative, significant value in
more than half of the comunas within the study area. This means that over time, murders in
these comunas decreased. While previous publications have pointed to falling homicides in
Medellin throughout the study period, the results here give a more detailed- neighborhood
level- picture of how homicide changed over time in Medellin. The strong, negative
correlations in Comuna 1 and Comuna 13 (with correlation coefficients of - 0.907 and -0.902,
respectively) are of importance as these are areas known to have experienced high rates of
violence. All of the barrios that contain the high homicide clusters in the 12 mapped time
periods show strong negative correlations with time. These results are not surprising as it has
been well establi shed that crime fell citywide during this period.
The results of the Moran's I statistic (Question one) contrast sharply with the mapped
Getis-Ord Gi

* stati stic, which was used as the basis of questions two, three, and six.

As

Figure 6 through Figure 17 show, there is a large amount of period-to-period change in
homicide clustering when viewed at the neighborhood level. At face value, these maps are
more in line with my initial expectations, as clusters of homicide are visible (at least in the
first several maps) in the northeast of the city, in the neighborhoods most commonly
associated with violence. Additional homicide clusters are visible near the city center. These
city center homicide clusters are not surprising, either, as they are in line with other research
indicating city centers in Latin America as areas of possible high crime (Ceccato 2005;
Ceccato, Haining, and Kahn 2007). Lastly, Comuna 13 does not contain any homicide
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clusters, a fact that reflects the increased security in this sector of the city in the years
fo llowing Operaci6n Orion .

Question four. How were the neighborhood-level homicide clusters affected by the
November 2003 disarmament and demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara
paramilitary organization?
The fo llowing tables (Table 2 and Table 3) contain the results of a paired sample ttest comparing variation in the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic from before and after the November
2003 paramilitary demobilization in Medellin; Figure 18 and Figure 19 contain the mapped
results of the cluster analysis. The results show a strong, positive correlation (0.826
correlation coefficient) in homicide clustering between the two periods. This means that

barrios with hi gh cluster values in the pre-demobilization period often had high cluster
values in the post-demobilization period. The t-test statistic indicates an insignificant amount
of variation from the first time period to the second; there is no difference in the cluster
stati stic in the two time periods (discussion to follow).

Question five. How was the neighborhood-level distribution of homicide affected by
the November 2003 disarmament and demobili zation of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara
param ilitary organization?
Table 4 and Table 5 contain the results of at-test comparing variation in the total,
raw homicides (normalized by time-period length) that occurred in Medellin before the
November 2003 paramil itary demobilization and those that occurred after the demobilization.
The results suggest that there is a significant difference in the distribution of homicide per
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barrio before and after the paramilitary demobilization. Interestingly, high-homicide barrios
in the two periods are well correlated
(0.830 correlation coefficient): those that experienced high homicides in the predemobilization period often had a large amount of homicides in the post-demobilization
period.
The variance observed in these raw homicide numbers goes along with my
expectations: due to the established overall drop in homicide throughout the study period
there would be variance when looking at the homicides divided into two periods, before and
after the demobilization. The drop in homicide was not uniform across the entire city so it is
normal that a degree of variation exists between the two periods. That said, the two periods
are similar, as the strong, positive correlation between the two periods indicates. This
correlation is likely due to the number of high-homicide barrios that exist just north of the
city center in both periods (This is also seen in the two-month time periods used in other
analyses in this dataset).

Table 2.
Homicide Cluster T-Test Correlation Table from Pre- and Post-Demobilization.
Paired Samples Correlations•
Correlation

N

Pair 1

Sig.

Pre-Demobilization and Post267

.826

.000

Demobilization Getis-Ord Gi* values
a.AII values have been normalized by the number of days in each period

Table 3.
Homicide Cluster T-Test Results from Pre- and Post-Demobilization.
Pa ired Samples Test•
Paired Differences
95% Confidence Interval of the
Difference
Mean
Pair

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Lower

Sig. (2Upper

df

tailed)

Pre-Demobilization and Post-.05366547153558 .73967614593298 .04526744499376 -.14279355454062 .03546261146946 -1 .186 266

.237

Demobilization Getis-Ord Gi* values
a. All values have been normalized by the number of days in each period

V'l

00

Table 4.

Total Homicide T-Test Correlation Table from Pre- and Post-Demobilization
Paired Samples Correlations•
N
Pair 1

Correlation

Sig.

Pre-Demobilization and Post-

267

.830

.000

Demobilization Homicide Values
a.AII values have been normalized by the number of days in each period.

Table 5.

Total Homicide T-Test Results from Pre- and Post-Demobilization
Paired Samples Test•
Paired Differences

95% Confidence Interval of the
Sig. (2-

Difference
Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Lower

Upper

df

tailed)

Pair Pre-Demobilization and Post-

.00790785891386 .01780003131694 .00108934422579
Demobilization Homicide Values
a.AII values have been normalized by the number of days in each period

.00576302474902

.01005269307869 7.259 266

.000
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Figure 18. Pre-demobilization Homicide Clusters in Medellin. 1:80,000 scale
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The fact that there was little variation amongst the clustering variable (Question
four) suggests that while the homicides themselves may have occurred in different

barrios, as the variance in homicide suggests, this variance was not enough to show up in
the variance analysis of the Getis-Ord Gi *, which is itself a function of each barrios
relationship with its immediate neighbor rather than a direct indication of actual homicide
levels. While the location of homicides varied before and after the demobilization this
variance was so small that it did not affect the homicide clusters.

Question Six. Do the bi-monthly results from question 2 and 3 show November
2003 to be an important time-period when considering changes in raw homicide numbers
and clustering of homicide?
Appendix C shows the results of a one-way AN OVA test of variance. The results
show the level and significance of variance between each of the 12 time periods
represented in the preceding maps (Figure 6 through Figure 17). Additionally, the
results of this one-way ANOVA corroborate the findings from questions two and three:
there is little variation between periods when analyzing the Getis-Ord Gi* while there is
significant variation when analyzing the homicide figures themselves.
The ANOV A analysis shows the November-December 2003 time period, the
period in which the demobilization took place, as being on the edge of what I consider to
be one ofthree distinct stages within the two-year span of homicide figures that make up
the Homicide Dataset.
The first distinct stage contains periods one through three. These three periods
have more in common with one another than they do with the rest of the twelve time
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periods. Of these three periods, not one is shown to be significantly related to any of the
time periods after January-February 2004 (period 7).
The second stage contains time periods four through six: July, 2003 through
December, 2003. These three periods represent a transition phase, in that they have
similarities with many of the twelve time periods and are only significantly different from
those at the very beginning or very end of the study period. For example, period four is
not significantly different from any of the twelve periods, with period twelve being the
only period to even threaten the threshold of significant difference. Period six, the time
period that includes the date of the paramilitary disarmament, on the other hand, is only
significantly different from period one. Period five is right in the middle of this transition
phase and shares relative commonality with every time period in the study.
The third and final stage contains time periods seven through twelve: the entire
year of2004. This stage is characterized by mutual similarities as much as collective
dissimilarities with those time periods from the beginning of2003. None of these
remaining six time periods share any significant commonality with the first three time
periods. The final period, twelve, varies significantly from the first five periods, and is
the only period in this third group to vary significantly from more than the first three
periods
While the period including the November 2003 disarmament (period six) is on the
edge of what I consider to be one ofthe three stages in the two-year span it should also be
noted that it has much in common, in terms of overall variation, with all but one of the 12
time periods. The fact that the time period containing the date of demobilization (period
six) is on the edge of the second of three stages of change inside indicates that the
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demobilization had a hand in changing the landscape of homicide in the city during the
two-year period. This being said, the fact that the clusters themselves are not heavily
varied suggests the effect of disarmament on homicide locations was small, with
homicides shifting to neighboring barrios rather than completely different areas of the
city.
Another possibility is that analyzing variance in the cluster statistic may not be an
appropriate indicator of shifts in homicide during the study period. A degree of
autocorrelation exists in the cluster statistic that is not present in the raw numbers of
those killed. As noted above, the statistic is based not only on the events that occurred in
the barrios of Medellin (in this case homicides) but is also a function of the relationship
between the number of events in any given barrio, its neighboring barrios, and the city
on a whole. Therefore I do not place much significance in the results of the t-test using
the cluster values as the key variable.
The results of both tests for variance in homicides per barrio (both the t-test and
ANOV A) indicate that the 2004 paramilitary disarmament in Medellin had a significant
effect on the geography of homicide in the city. Previous research indicates that the
increase in reinserted paramilitaries per zone,- persons that had taken part in the state
sponsored demobilization and disarmament program-from 2003 to 2004, was
proportional to the drop in homicide in that zone 14 (Ramirez 2008). The demobilization
occurred in November of 2003 and while Comuna 1 had the highest number of reinserted
paramilitaries (Ramirez 2008), the incidence of clustered high-homicide barrios in

Comuna 1 and its neighboring comunas was essentially zero as of August, 2003, three
months before the actual disarmament. By late November 2003 Comuna 1 had already
14

Ramirez (2008) studied violence in Medellin breaking the city into several zones: groups of comunas.
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experienced a drop in crime (from a total of 40 in January and February of2003 to only
11 in September and October of that same year) suggesting that the disarmament was not
the cause of the initial fall in homicides in that part ofthe city.
It is my belief that the drop in homicide clustering in Comuna I is a result of
increased security, in a similar manner to how security affected violence in Comuna I3.
While there was no military operation in Comuna I , there was an increase in police
presence across the city after Operaci6n Orion . Another factor in declining homicides in
the northeast of the city is the commencement of a large scale public works project that
began in late 2003 and came online in August of2004: Lina K of the Medellin's metro
(see Metro de Medellin). Lina K, a gondola that runs from a standard metro (light rail)
station up to the heights of the Santo Domingo area of Comuna I , is the first of two

metrocables now in operation in the city. While the construction on the metrocable does
not explain Comuna J's early drop in violence, it certainly resulted in increased security
in the comuna and coincides with the paramilitary demobilization. Furthermore, the
project brought a new level of access to the comuna residents of northeast Medellin. This
increase in access had two effects on Comuna I contributing to the further, sustained
drop in homicides: (1) increased economic integration with the rest of the city and (2)
increased social integration.
Increased access to the urban center of Medellin likely resulted in increased
economic integration, higher socioeconomic conditions, and lower crime for the people
of northeastern Medellin, who had been socially excluded prior to the construction of the

metrocable. More than simple poverty, social exclusion is grounded in the lack of power,
self-dignity, and economic opportunity (Kenyon, Lyons, and Rafferty 2002). By building
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a metro that integrated the residents of Comuna 1 with the rest of Medellin, the local
government gave the residents of Comuna 1 an increased role in the social fabric of the
city, allowing them physical access to legitimate sources of power and economic
opportunity. Furthermore, by constructing the metrocable, the local government sent a
message of inclusion and acceptance to the residents of Comuna 1.
The absence of cold-spots in the analysis represents another unexpected outcome.
I had expected Comuna 14, the comuna with the most strata-six barrios, to have the
lowest homicide levels and to therefore contai n a consistent cold spot. These data show
the locations of clustered high-homicide barrios yet there are no such clusters of lowhomicide barrios. To make sure that this lack of cold-spots was not simply a function of
the small neighborhood size chosen for this analysis I performed a second hot-spot
analysis using the January to February, 2003 data. In this second analysis, instead of
using contiguous barrios to define the neighborhood, I used a fixed distance band of one
kilometer. This one-kilometer band reaches farther than the size of the average barrio
(less than half a square kilometer) yet does not violate the reasoning behind the choice of
a small neighborhood to begin with (see methodo logy). The results, (not pictured) did
not have an impact on the appearance of cold spots in the study. Regardless of
neighborhood definition there was a random distribution of homicides across much of
Medellin during the study period.
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Human Rights Abuse Dataset
In an effort to better understand the impact of Operacion Orion on violence in
Medellin I have addressed three questions regarding the change in deadly human rights
abuses from 2001 through 2005.
1. Is there a significant negative correlation with monthly human rights abuses
and time?
2. Is there a significant amount of variance in deadly human rights abuses before
and after Operacion Orion?
3. Is there a significant amount of variance in the clustering of deadly human
rights abuses before and after Operacion Orion?

Question one. Is there a significant negative correlation with monthly human
rights abuses and time?
Table 6 shows a weak, negative, statistically significant correlation between
human rights abuses and time. In other words, as time passed, the number of citywide
deadly human rights violations dropped throughout the study period. This is also visible
in Figure 20.

Question two. Is there a significant amount of variance in deadly human rights
abuses before and after Operacion Orion ?
The mapped results (Figure 2 1 and Figure 22) show that there is a large difference
in the geography of human rights violations pre- and post-Operacion Orion. This
observation is backed up by the results ofthe t-test (Table 7 and Table 8), which show
deadly human rights violation from the pre-Orion period to be significantly varied from
those of the post-Orion period. The two time periods share a weak, significant
correlation of 0.163. While the correlation is positive, it is not strong enough to conclude
that barrios with high human rights violations pre-Orion also contained

hi g~

human
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rights violations post-Orion. The inferential stati stics indicate that there is significant
variation between the two time-periods: there is a difference between pre- and post-Orion
homicides.

Deadly Human Rights Abuses Over Time
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Figure 20. Graph of deadly human rights abuses over time.
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Table 6.
Spearman's Correlation showing change in rights abuses over time, January 2001 through
December 2005.
Correlations
Abuses per
Total Months
Spearman's

Total Month

Correlation

Correlation Coefficient

1.000

Abuses per

Correlation Coefficient

month

Sig. (2-tailed)

N
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

-.589..
.000

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

Month

47

47

-.589 ..

1.000

.000

47

47
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Figure 2 1. Pre-Operaci6n Orion Human rights abuses in Medellin. 1:80,000
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These results illustrating the importance of Operacion Orion are supported by the
raw numbers; there were 0.51 deaths per day reported as human rights violation in the
pre-Orion period as opposed to 0.11 deaths per day in the post-Orion period. In Comuna
13, where the operation took place, there was a drop of 62.5%. The citywide drop is even
larger: a 78.4% change. While it would be foolish to attribute all of these change to

Operacion Orion - more has happened in Comuna 13 than this military operation,
including a great deal of humanitarian work and investment in education- the statistics
point to Operacion Orion as an important factor in the drop in deadly human rights
abuses in the city. 15

Question three. Is there a sign ificant amount of variance in the clustering of
deadly human-rights abuses before and after Operacion Orion ?
Unlike the results from the preceding question, the results of the t-test (Table 9
and Table 10) comparing pre-Orion and post-Orion Getis-Ord Gi* values show no
significant difference between the two periods. The test reveals that the two time periods
also share a stronger positive correlation than they did in question two. Again, for the
same reasons stated earlier in this chapter, I do not consider the results of the cluster
based t-test to be an accurate representation of the actual trends of violence in thi s study.

15

Again, these numbers not include those deaths that occurred during Operaci6n Orion.

Table 7.

Total Deadly Human Rights Abuse T-Test Correlation Table, Pre- and Post-Operacion Orion
Paired Samples Correlations
N
Pair 1

Correlation

Sig.

Pre-Orion and Post-Orion
267

.163

.007

Human Rights Violations

Table 8.

Total Deadly Human Rights Abuse T-Test Results, Pre- and Post-Operacion Orion
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Lower

Upper

df Sig. (2-tailed)

Pair 1 Pre-Orion and Post-Orion
.00097585768539 .00355905401002 .00021781056820
Human Rights Violations

.00054700559523

.00140470977555 4.480 266

.000

Table 9.
Total Deadly Human Rights Cluster T-Test Correlation Table, Pre- and Post-Operacion Orion.
Paired Samples Correlations

Pair 1

N

Correlation

Sig.

267

.412

.000

Pre-Ori6n and Post-Ori6n
Getis-Ord Gi• Values

Table 10.
Total Deadly Human Rights Clusters T-Test Results, Pre- and Post-Operacion Orion.
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Sig. (2-

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Mean
Pair 1

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Lower

Upper

df

tailed)

Pre-Ori6n and PostOri6n
Getis-Ord Gi• Values

.06285177711610 1.30654821494386EO

7.99594522236040E-2 -9.45821733930353E-2 2.20285727625245E-1

.786 266

.433
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Socioeconomic Indicators
The output ofthe Spearman's correlation test (Table 11) shows the degree of
correlation between the socioeconomic stratification of a given barrio and the homicides
that occurred in that barrio from 2003 through 2004. There is only a .04 correlation
coefficient linking barrio-level homicides (all the homicides in the 12 time-periods from
the Homicide Dataset) to the socioeconomic indicator. The correlation output shows that
homicides from 2003-2004 have an insignificant relationship with the socioeconomic
stratification figures derived by the Colombian government. While previous studies have
shown homicides to have a positive correlation with areas of high poverty and/or of low
socioeconomic class, the results indicate this was not the case in Medellin.

Table 11.
Strata and Homicide Correlation Table
Correlations
Homicides
Spearman's rho

Total Homicides per Barrio

Correlation Coefficient

1.000

Sig . (2-tailed)

Strata
.040
.511

N

267

267

Barrio-level Social

Correlation Coefficient

.040

1.000

Stratification

Sig. (2-tailed)

.511

N

267

267

This change in cluster location, as shown in Figures 4 through 15, surprised me
and when considered along with the results of the socioeconomic correlation some
interesting questions are raised about the relationship between poverty and violence in
Medellin. As di scussed earlier, in 2004 Medellin fit the Griffin/Ford model of Latin
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American city structure quite well, especially when considering the location of the urban
poor, who live primarily in the periphery of Medellin (Griffin and Ford 1980; Ford 1996).
Given this social geography and previous findings linking homicide with various
measurements of poverty, I expected that homicides in Medellin would have occurred
predominantly in these low-strata, peripheral neighborhoods during every time period.
Not only would this have been in line with the findings of homicide studies in North
America but it would have paralleled finding from Latin America as well (Ceccato,
Haining, and Kahn 2007). However, this is not the case. Socioeconomic indicators and
homicide show no significant correlation in my findings and as the mapped Getis-Ord
Gi* statistic show, the high-homicide clusters are not contained wholly inside the
peripheral, lowest strata neighborhoods.
The lack of a relationship between homicide and socioeconomic class reflects the
nature of violence in Medellin. As shown earlier, crime and violence in the city have
historically taken on political tones in addition to being influenced by the drug trade. In
Medellin, neither of these two factors are necessarily related to socioeconomic class.
While political conflict may have been carried out predominantly in the peripheral, poor
neighborhoods, the violence associated with drugs occurred citywide. Though homicides
have dropped since 2002, the nature ofthe violence may not have changed, and it is my
belief that this is reflected in the lack of a positive correlation between homicide and
socioeconomic class during this period.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
This case study on violence in Medellin adds to the body of literature dealing with
urban crime, specifically homicide; but it also addresses issues related to urbanization,
political conflict, and the modern geography of the Latin American city. Previous
research on urban crime has shown that the urban poor bear the burden of violence at a
higher rate than their more economically well-off neighbors. In Latin American cities
this has meant that urban peripheral areas are often the most violent, although new
research, this study included, shows this is not always the case.
For example, Comuna I 0, near the city center of Medellin, contained a homicide
hotspot evident in all of the 12 homicide time periods; a detail that mirrors the findings of
Ceccato, Haining, and Kahn (2007) who note that the city center as well as the peripheral
parts of Sao Paulo exhibit higher crime than the rest of the city. At the same time, the
findings presented here show that not all peripherally located poor neighborhoods contain
higher crime rates than other parts of the city.
This study investigated the changing landscape of violence over a five-year period
in Medellin, highlighting factors that contributed to the city's falling violence as well as
raising questions about what other forces added to this trend. The tests for variance used
in this thesis show that both Operacion Orion and the paramilitary disarmament can be
viewed as dividing lines for before-and-after snapshots of the city, although the degree to
which they caused the fall in violence remains open to debate. For example, while it is
accepted that Operacion Orion expelled a militant element from Comuna 13, this event
was immediately followed by public and private investment in infrastructure, job
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creation, and education, all of which presumably contributed to the falling violence.
While other studies have pointed to the paramilitary disarmament as the primary
contribution to falling crime, especially in Comuna 1 and the city's northeast, this too
coincides with public investment, in the form of the city ' s first metrocable. The
examples listed above lay the groundwork for further veins of research. The city has seen
further investment after 2005, along with further drops in violence (at least in the short
term). One wonders what the relationships are between investment and violence and the
role of socioeconomic class.
The fact that violence and socioeconomic class are not related to one another in
this study is perhaps the most interesting component of the thesis. In my opinion this
points to the political nature of violence in the city, a phenomenon observed in other
studies (Ramirez 2008), as well as the complex economic makeup of the drug trade.
Since the late 1960s, Colombia as a whole and the city of Medellin in particular saw an
acceleration in political violence relating to state-sponsored paramilitaries, peasantsupported militants, agrarian conflict that has led to large-scale rural-urban and forced
migration, and the growth of areas with little or no state control. In the 1980s and 1990s,
the added financial and criminal influence of the drug cartels along with the increasingly
urban nature of the conflict exacerbated the violence.
While human rights violations did not end after Operaci6n Orion , they did fall as
a result, albeit after a lag period of about four months during which a great deal of
retribution between paramilitaries and militants occurred (Richter and Miller 2007;
Rozema 2007, 2008). Such a scenario, involving shifts in control between warring
factions, is something that has been observed elsewhere in Colombia and elsewhere in the
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developing world (Vargas 2009). It is still unknown to what degree and how quickly this
back-and-forth has decreased; it is clear that violence dropped after Operaci6n Orion but
assuming retributive killings continued, they may account for the nonexistent relationship
seen between violence and economics-political conflict can occur across economic
strata.
The drug trade is another factor that is not bound by economic strata. Pablo
Escobar is a good example of this. While in Medellin I was reminded several times of his
humble upbringing as well as his association with all types of people, rich and poor,
across the city. If the drug trade is not confined to a specific social class, this may help
account for the lack of a correlation between homicides and socioeconomic class in each
barrio.
Disarmament and demobilizations have taken place across Colombia at various
times throughout the twentieth century as a method for reconciliation of past grievances
and as a method of reintegrating armed groups into society. The November 2003
demobilization of the BCN in Medellin is unique as it is the principal example in a
current wave of demobilization and both the Colombian government and the citizens of
Medellin are invested in its success. If this demobilization is ultimately viewed as a
success, resulting in long-term reform, it could serve as an example of how to break the
cyclical nature of violence that has existed in Colombia for so long.
The city of Medellin has already recognized the value of investment in social and
infrastructural projects as a means to lower crime and homicides in particular. In
Medellin, the mayor's office devotes considerable resources to its Programa del Paz and
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Reconciliacion (Program for Peace and Reconciliation), which aims to reduce bloodshed
while reconciling past grievances between armed groups.
According to police statistics, citywide homicides have continued to decline from
2003 through 2007. Operaci6n Orion was a contributing factor to this drop in homicides
but the event also links Medellin with much larger international political currents. The
United States has now been involved in the "War on Drugs" for decades and it is likely
that the millions of dollars in U.S. aid that has been given to Colombian security forces in
the Clinton initiative known as Plan Colombia (McDermott 2000, Stokes 2003), in
addition to political pressure, helped make Operacion Orion possible.
Many of the residents I spoke with attributed the decline in homicides to local as
well as international investment in infrastructure and peace·projects. The metrocable
(Figure 23), in addition to being useful, can be seen as a metaphor for inclusion. In the
years since Operacion Orion other such symbol ic projects have been completed in
Medellin, such as schools, police stations and a bridge-£/ Puente El Mirador-that
connects two parts of a peripheral neighborhood that were once in conflict with one
another.
Both Operacion Orion and the paramilitary disarmament probably helped abate
this conflict. This study shows that, in agreement with other research, there is persistent
high crime in the city center of Medellin. However, it also shows that the distribution of
crime in Medellin does not fit other spatial and social patterns observed in other cities.
While previous research on urban violence focused on clear patterns and relationships
between class, geography and violence, this study shows that these patterns do not always
hold true.
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There will soon be three operational metrocables in Medellin and while in the city
I observed the construction of several new school s and libraries across the city. Though
the impacts of this type of investment in low-strata neighborhoods of Medellin has yet to
be formally measured, it is an indication that the city has at least recognized the
importance in formally including all residents of the city in the municipal life, potentially
decreasing violence as a result.
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Figure 23. Photo of the city metro with the metrocable in the distance.
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APPENDIX A
HOMICIDE VALUES AND TIME
Time period
Spearman's Correlation

Time period

Correlation Coefficient

1.000

Sig . (2-tailed)

N
Comuna1

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Comuna2

Correlation Coefficient
Sig . (2-tailed)

N
Comuna3

Correlation Coefficient
Sig . (2-tailed)

N
Comuna4

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Comuna5

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Comuna6

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Comuna7

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Comuna8

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Comuna9

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N
Comuna10

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

N

12

..

- .907

.000
12

..

-.801

.002
12

..

-.888

.000
12
-.844

..

.001
12
-.687
.01 4
12
-.533
.074
12

..

-.787

.002
12

..

-.884

.000
12

..

-.888

.000
12

..

-.740

.006
12
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Comuna11

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna12

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna13

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna14

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna 15

Correlation Coefficient
Sig . (2-tailed)
N

Comuna16

Correlation Coefficient
Sig . (2-tailed)
N

Comuna25

-.074
.820
12
-.430
.163
12
-.902

..

.000
12
-. 193
.548
12
-. 389
.212
12
-.214
.504
12

Correlation Coefficient
Sig . (2-tailed)
N

Comuna37

Correlation Coefficient
Sig . (2-tailed)
N

**.
*.

Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) .

12
-. 019
.954
12
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APPENDIX B
GETIS-ORD GI* CLUSTER VALUES AND TIME
Time period
Spearman's Correlation

Time period

Correlation Coefficient

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Comuna 1

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna 2

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna 3

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna 4

.008
12
-.755

..

.005
12

12
.371

SiQ . (2-tailed)

.236
12

.

Correlation Coefficient

.678

SiQ. (2-tailed)

.015
12

Correlation Coefficient

.154

SiQ . (2-tailed)

.633

Correlation Coefficient

N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig . (2-tailed)
N
Comuna 10

..

Correlation Coefficient

SiQ . (2-tailed)

Comuna 9

- .720

.914

N
Comuna 8

12

Sig . (2-tailed)

N
Comuna 7

.014

.035

N
Comuna 6

-.685

Correlation Coefficient

N
Comuna 5

12

12
-.720

..

.008
12
-. 587
.045
12

Correlation Coefficient

.531

Sig . (2-tailed)

.075

N

12
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Comuna 11

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Comuna 12

.245

Correlation Coefficient

.513
12

Sig. (2-tailed)

.080
12

Correlation Coefficient

.476

Sig. (2-tailed)

.118

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tai led)

N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Comuna 37

-.210

.524

N

Comuna 25

12

Correlation Coefficient

N

Comuna 16

12

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

Comuna 15

.009

.364

Sig. (2-tailed)

Comuna 14

-

Correlation Coefficient

N
Comuna 13

.713

12

..

.818

.001
12
-.650
.022
12

Correlation Coefficient

.210

Sig. (2-tailed)

.5 13

N
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) .

12
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APPENDIX C
ONE WAY ANOVA
ANOVA
Total Homicides
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

249.666

11

22.697

With in Groups

9151 .633

3192

2.867

Total

9401 .299

3203

Between Groups

F

SiQ.
7.916

.000

Multiple Comparisons
Total Homicides
Hochber~

(J)
fl) Period Period

1

2

95% Confidence Interval

Mean Difference (1J)

Std. Error

Sig.

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

2

.112

.147

1.000

-.38

.61

3

.154

.147

1.000

-.34

.65

4

.404

.147

.319

-.09

.90

5

.378

.147

.480

-.11

.87

6

.551

.147

.011

.06

1.04

7

.693

.147

.000

.20

1.19

8

.719

.147

.000

.23

1.21

9

.655

.147

.001

.16

1.15

10

.745

.147

.000

.25

1.24

11

.768

.147

.000

.27

1.26

12

.884

.147

.000

.39

1.38

1

-.112

.147

1.000

-.61

.38

3

.041

.147

1.000

-.45

.53

4

.292

.147

.955

-.20

.79

5

.266

.147

.991

-.23

.76

6

.438

.147

.169

-.05

.93

7

.581

.147

.005

.09

1.07

8

.607

.147

.002

.11

1.10

9

.543

.147

.01 4

.05

1.04

10

.633

.147

.001

.14

1.13

11

.655

.147

.001

.16

1.15

12

.772

.147

.000

.28

1.26
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3

1

-.154

.147

1.000

-.65

.34

2

-.041

.147

1.000

-.53

.45

4

.251

.147

.997

-.24

.74

5

.225

.147

1.000

-.27

.72

6

.397

.147

.361

-.10

.89

.147

.016

.05

1.03

.147

.008

.07

1.06

.147

.040

.01

.99

10

.
.539
.
.566
.
.502
.
.592

.147

.004

.1 0

1.08

11

.614

.147

.002

.12

1.11

12

.730

.147

.000

.24

1.22

1

-.404

.147

.319

-.90

.09

2

-.292

.147

.955

-.79

.20

3

-.251

.147

.997

-.74

.24

5

-.026

.147

1.000

-.52

.47

6

.146

.147

1.000

-.35

.64

7

.288

.147

.963.

-.20

.78

8

.315

.147

.881

-.18

.81

9

.251

.147

.997

-.24

.74

10

.341

.147

.737

-.15

.83

11

.363

.147

.583

-.13

.86

12

.479

.147

.069

-.01

.97

1

-.378

.147

.480

-.87

.11

2

-.266

.147

.991

-.76

.23

3

-.225

.147

1.000

-.72

.27

4

.026

.147

1.000

-.47

.52

6

.172

.147

1.000

-.32

.67

7

.315

.147

.88 1

-.18

.81

8

.341

.147

.737

-.15

.83

9

.277

.147

.98 1

-.22

.77

10

.367

.147

.557

-.13

.86

11

.390

.147

.407

-.10

.88

12

.506

.147

.037

.01

1.00

1

-.551

.147

.011

-1 .04

-.06

2

-.438

.147

.169

-.93

.05

3

-.397

.147

.361

-.89

.10

4

-.1 46

.147

1.000

-. 64

.35

5

-.172

.1 47

1.000

-.67

.32

7
8
9

4

5

6

89

7

8

9

7

.142

.147

1.000

-.35

.64

8

.169

.147

1.000

-.32

.66

9

.105

.147

1.000

-.39

.60

10

.195

.147

1.000

-.30

.69

11

.217

.147

1.000

-.28

.71

12

.333

.147

.783

-.16

.83

1

-.693

.147

.000

-1 .19

-.20

2

-.58 1

.147

.005

-1 .07

-.09

3

-.539

.147

.016

-1.03

-.05

4

-.288

.147

.963

-.78

.20

5

-.315

.147

.881

-.81

.18

6

-.1 42

.147

1.000

-.64

.35

8

.026

.147

1.000

-.47

.52

9

-.037

.147

1.000

-.53

.46

10

.052

.147

1.000

-.44

.55

11

.075

.147

1.000

-.42

.57

12

.191

.147

1.000

-.30

.68

1

-.719

.147

.000

-1.21

-.23

2

-.607

.147

.002

-1 .10

-.11

3

-. 566

.147

.008

-1.06

-.07

4

-.3 15

.147

.881

-.81

.18

5

-.34 1

.147

.737

-.83

.15

6

-.169

.147

1.000

-.66

.32

7

-.026

.147

1.000

-.52

.47

9

-.064

.147

1.000

-.56

.43

10

.026

.147

1.000

-.47

.52

11

.049

.1 47

1.000

-.44

.54

12

.165

.147

1.000

-.33

.66

1

-.655

.147

.001

-1 .15

-.16

2

-.543

.147

.014

-1.04

-.05

3

-.502

.147

.040

-.99

.00

4

-.251

.147

.997

-.74

.24

5

-.277

.147

.98 1

-.77

.22

6

-.105

.147

1.000

-.60

.39

7

.037

.147

1.000

-.46

.53

8

.064

.147

1.000

-.43

.56

10

.090

.147

1.000

-.40

.58

11

.112

.1 47

1.000

-.38

.61

90
12
10

11

12

.228

.147

1.000

-.26

.72

.147

.000

-1.24

-.25

1

.
-.745

2

-.633

.147

.001

-1 .13

-.14

3

-.592

.1 47

.004

-1.08

-. 10

4

-.341

.147

.737

-.83

.15

5

-.367

.147

.557

-.86

.13

6

-.195

.147

1.000

-. 69

.30

7

-.052

.1 47

1.000

-.55

.44

8

-.026

.147

1.000

-.52

.47

9

-.090

.1 47

1.000

-. 58

.40

11

.022

.147

1.000

-.47

.52

12

.139

.147

1.000

-. 35

.63

1

-.768

.147

.000

-1.26

-.27

2

- .655

.147

.001

-1.15

-. 16

3

-.614

.147

.002

-1.11

-.12

4

-.363

.147

.583

-. 86

.13

5

-.390

.147

.407

-. 88

.10

6

-.217

.147

1.000

-.71

.28

7

-.075

.147

1.000

-.57

.42

8

-.049

.147

1.000

-.54

.44

9

-.11 2

.147

1.000

-.61

.38

10

-.022

.147

1.000

-.52

.47

12

.11 6

.147

1.000

-.38

.61

1

-.884

.147

.000

-1 .38

-.39

2

-.772

.147

.000

-1.26

-.28

3

-.730

.1 47

.000

-1.22

-.24

4

-.479

.147

.069

-.97

.01

5

-.506

.147

.037

-1.00

-.01

6

-.333

.147

.783

-.83

.16

7

-.191

.147

1.000

-.68

.30

8

-.165

.147

1.000

-.66

.33

9

-.228

.147

1.000

-.72

.26

10

-.139

.147

1.000

-.63

.35

11

-.11 6

.147

1.000

-.6 1

.38

.

.

*.The mean difference is siQnificant at the 0.05 1evel.
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